Publication

In the case of Incorporated Trustees of Lawyers of Likeminds V. Attorney General of Imo State & Anor (Suit No. Hmi/208/2025, judgment of 18 February 2026), the High Court, presided over by Hon. Justice L.C. Alinnor, struck down Sections 258 and 259 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law (ACJL) 2020. These provisions had imposed rigid timelines for the conclusion of criminal trials: 540 days for capital offences, 360 days for offences triable on information, 180 days for summary trials, 30 days for bail applications, and 90 days for interlocutory applications, and prescribed sanctions for non-compliance.

On their face, these timelines sought to accelerate justice. Yet the Court rightly recognized that justice cannot be reduced to a formulaic timetable, particularly when the Constitution vests judicial authority exclusively in the courts under Section 6(6). By attempting to dictate the pace of judicial proceedings, Sections 258 and 259 infringed the doctrine of separation of powers, impermissibly encroaching upon the judiciary’s discretion and undermining defendants’ rights to a fair trial.

The Court also drew on Unongo v. Aku (1983) 11 SC 93 to reaffirm that judicial powers include inherent authority to regulate court proceedings. Attempts to impose statutory time limits on trials, no matter how well-intentioned, risk compromising fairness, particularly where complex criminal matters involve witness coordination, counsel availability, and infrastructural constraints. Section 36(1) of the Constitution further enshrines the right to trial within a “reasonable time,” which is inherently flexible and context-sensitive—a nuance rigid statutory timelines cannot capture.

The human rights implications are clear. Defendants in criminal trials must enjoy:

1. The presumption of innocence, until proven guilty;

2. Adequate time and opportunity to prepare their defence;

3. Access to legal representation;

4. Protection against arbitrary judicial or legislative interference.

By striking down Sections 258 and 259 of the ACJL, the Imo High Court reinforced that speed cannot supplant justice, and that procedural expediency must not be weaponized against the accused. Moreover, the court’s recognition of citizen standing in constitutional challenges underscores the role of public interest litigation in protecting human rights in the criminal process.

The case is a clarion call for lawmakers, legal practitioners, and citizens alike: defending the rights of the accused is defending the Constitution itself. Any criminal justice reform must harmonize efficiency with fairness, and must never dilute the rights guaranteed under Section 36 and the broader doctrine of separation of powers. The Constitution is not a tool to expedite convictions; it is the safeguard of liberty, equality, and human dignity.